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hal.structure.identifierDauphine Recherches en Management [DRM]
dc.contributor.authorde La Bruslerie, Hubert*
hal.structure.identifierGroupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management [GRANEM]
dc.contributor.authorDeffains-Crapsky, Catherine*
dc.date.accessioned2018-12-06T14:31:05Z
dc.date.available2018-12-06T14:31:05Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.issn0929-1199
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/18262
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectStock optionsen
dc.subjectOptimal incentive contracten
dc.subjectAsymmetry of informationen
dc.subjectNegotiationen
dc.subjectManagerial poweren
dc.subject.ddc658.1en
dc.subject.classificationjelG.G3.G35en
dc.subject.classificationjelK.K2.K22en
dc.titleInformation asymmetry, contract design and process of negotiation: The stock option awarding caseen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenStock option plans are used to increase managerial incentives, and business practices usually set the exercise price equal to the stock market price. The purpose of this paper is to underline the importance of a process of negotiation leading to a possible equilibrium contract satisfying both managers and shareholders. The two key variables of the model are the percentage of equity capital offered by the shareholders to the managers and the exercise price of the options that may be at a discount. We explicitly introduce risk aversion and information asymmetries in the form of (i) an economic uncertainty in the gain of cash flow, (ii) possibly biased information between the two parties and (iii) a noise in the valuation price of the stock in the market. The existence of a process of negotiation between shareholders and managers leading to a possible disclosure of private information is highlighted. As a conclusion, we show that “efficient” stock option plans should be granted in a context of trade-off between the percentage of capital awarded to managers and the discount in stock price.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameJournal of Corporate Finance
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol14en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue2en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2008
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages73-91en
dc.relation.isversionofdoi10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.01.001en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelGestion financièreen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.relation.forthcomingprintnonen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenonen
dc.description.halcandidateouien
dc.description.readershiprechercheen
dc.description.audienceInternationalen
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedouien
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedouien
dc.date.updated2018-11-23T11:55:31Z
hal.identifierhal-01947223*
hal.version1*
hal.update.actionupdateMetadata*
hal.author.functionaut
hal.author.functionaut


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