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dc.contributor.authorde La Bruslerie, Hubert*
dc.date.accessioned2018-12-05T12:56:29Z
dc.date.available2018-12-05T12:56:29Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.issn0264-9993
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/18256
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectContingent claimen
dc.subjectCorporate governanceen
dc.subjectPrivate benefitsen
dc.subjectControlling shareholdersen
dc.subjectDebt leverageen
dc.subjectOption valuation modelen
dc.subject.ddc658.1en
dc.subject.classificationjelD.D7.D78en
dc.subject.classificationjelG.G3.G34en
dc.titleDoes debt curb controlling shareholder's private benfits? Modelling in a contingent claim frameworken
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenDebt is not frequently analyzed in relation to the conflict between controlling and outside shareholders. At the same time, debt leverage stands as a key variable in the design of a control contract as it has a strong disciplinary role. A simple option valuation model is used to show that debt is also a governance variable because it can moderate or enhance private benefits. It is argued that an asymmetrical self-regulation mechanism may develop in the case of control by a dominant shareholder. The joint questions of control, private benefits, and debt levels are linked within an inside corporate governance framework. At low levels of leverage, debt is relatively less disciplinary compared with a non-private benefits case. When leverage exceeds a threshold point, it becomes strongly disciplinary. We show that under given conditions, a self-regulation mechanism develops where the controlling shareholder is incentivized to hold less debt when he/she wants to increase his/her private appropriation rate.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameEconomic Modelling
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol58en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2016
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages263-282en
dc.relation.isversionofdoi10.1016/j.econmod.2016.06.002en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelGestion financièreen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.relation.forthcomingprintnonen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenonen
dc.description.halcandidateouien
dc.description.readershiprechercheen
dc.description.audienceInternationalen
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedouien
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedouien
dc.date.updated2018-11-23T11:57:13Z
hal.person.labIds1032*
hal.identifierhal-01945646*


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