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Corrupt Governments receive less State-to-state aid Governance and the delivery of foreign and through Non State Actor

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NOPOOR WP#4_N°15_Corrupt Governments Do Not Receive More State-to-State Aid.pdf (1.894Mb)
Date
2015
Dewey
Croissance et développement économiques
Sujet
aid allocation; aid channels; governance
JEL code
F.F3.F35; D.D7.D73; L.L3.L31; F.F5.F53
Journal issue
Journal of Development Economics;0304-3878
Volume
114
Publication date
05-2015
Article pages
20-33
Publisher
Elsevier
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.11.005
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/18043
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  • Projet Nopoor
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Author
Acht, Martin
138571 University of Bonn
Mahmoud, Toman Omar
160055 Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy)
Thiele, Rainer
160055 Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy)
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
A core result of the aid allocation literature is that the quality of governance in recipient countries does not affect the amounts of foreign aid received. Donor countries may still give aid to poorly-governed countries because of a dilemma they face: those countries most in need typically also lack proper institutions. This paper argues that donors try to resolve this dilemma by delivering aid through non-state actors. Using aid shares as well as absolute amounts of aid allocated through state and non-state channels and considering different dimensions of governance, we provide evidence that bypassing governments via NGOs and multilateral organizations is indeed a response to weak recipient state institutions. The effect is stronger in aid sectors where donors can more easily switch between channels, and weaker for higher levels of economic self-interest among donors.

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