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Understanding and Information Failures in Insurance: Evidence from India

Platteau, Jean-Philippe; Ontiveros, Darwin Ugarte (2014), Understanding and Information Failures in Insurance: Evidence from India. https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/18015

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NOPOOR WP#9_N°13_Understanding and information failures in Insurance.pdf (1.488Mb)
Type
Document de travail / Working paper
Date
2014
Titre de la collection
NOPOOR Working Paper
Numéro dans la collection
13
Pages
52
Métadonnées
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Auteur(s)
Platteau, Jean-Philippe
Department of economics
Ontiveros, Darwin Ugarte
University of Namur - FUNDP / URBC 61
Résumé (EN)
This paper is an attempt to understand the factors behind low contract renewal rates frequently observed in insurance programs in poor countries. This is done on the basis of the experience of a micro-insurance health program in India. We show that deficient information about the insurance product and the functioning of the scheme, and poor understanding of the insurance concept are the major causes of the low contract renewal rate among households which had previously enrolled into the program. A central finding is that, when a household has received a large negative payout during the preceding year, it is more inclined to opt out of the program unless it has a good understanding of what insurance means. In other words, the adverse impact of negative insurance payouts on contract renewal is conditional upon the presence of a cognitive bias which violates the expected utility theory. Moreover, trust in the insurance company has a significant positive effect, yet that effect cannot be disentangled from that of understanding ability. The policy implication of our findings is considerable since they provide a strong justification for mandatory universal health insurance.
Mots-clés
insurance literacy; microinsurance; Microfinance
JEL
G21 - Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
I13 - Health Insurance, Public and Private
O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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