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Long persuasion games

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plugin-cesifo1_wp1669-1.pdf (416.5Kb)
Date
2008
Dewey
Economie politique
Sujet
Information privée; jeux non-coopératifs
JEL code
D82; C72
Journal issue
Journal of Economic Theory
Volume
143
Number
1
Publication date
05-2008
Article pages
1-35
Publisher
Elsevier
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.006
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/179
Collections
  • CEREMADE : Publications
  • LEDa : Publications
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Author
Koessler, Frédéric
Forges, Françoise
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
This paper characterizes geometrically the sets of all Nash and perfect Bayesian equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium characterization is provided for unilateral persuasion games, and the second for multistage, bilateral persuasion games. As in Aumann and Hart [R.J. Aumann, S. Hart, Long cheap talk, Econometrica 71 (6) (2003) 1619–1660], we use the concepts of diconvexification and dimartingale. A leading example illustrates both geometric characterizations and shows how the expert, whatever his type, can increase his equilibrium payoff compared to all equilibria of the unilateral persuasion game by delaying information certification.

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