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hal.structure.identifierCentre de recherche en économie et management [CREM]
dc.contributor.authorPoutineau, Jean-Christophe
HAL ID: 173590
ORCID: 0000-0002-0189-4195
*
hal.structure.identifierLaboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa]
hal.structure.identifierCentre de recherche en économie et management [CREM]
dc.contributor.authorVermandel, Gauthier*
dc.date.accessioned2018-03-28T11:45:12Z
dc.date.available2018-03-28T11:45:12Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.issn0164-0704
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/17601
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectMacroprudential policyen
dc.subjectGlobal bankingen
dc.subjectInternational business cyclesen
dc.subjectEuro areaen
dc.subject.ddc337en
dc.subject.classificationjelF.F3.F34en
dc.subject.classificationjelE.E5.E58en
dc.subject.classificationjelF.F4.F42en
dc.titleGlobal banking and the conduct of macroprudential policy in a monetary unionen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenThis paper questions the role of cross-border lending in the definition of national macroprudential policies in the European Monetary Union. We build and estimate a two-country DSGE model with corporate and interbank cross-border loans, Core-Periphery diverging financial cycles and a national implementation of coordinated macroprudential measures based on Countercyclical Capital Buffers. We get three main results. First, targeting a national credit-to-GDP ratio should be favored to federal averages as this rule induces better stabilizing performances in front of important divergences in credit cycles between core and peripheral countries. Second, policies reacting to the evolution of national credit supply should be favored as the transmission channel of macroprudential policy directly impacts the marginal cost of loan production and, by so, financial intermediaries. Third, the interest of lifting up macroprudential policymaking to the supra-national level remains questionable for admissible value of international lending between Eurozone countries. Indeed, national capital buffers reacting to the union-wide loan-to-GDP ratio only lead to the same stabilization results than the one obtained under the national reaction if cross-border lending reaches 45%. However, even if cross-border linkages are high enough to justify the implementation of a federal adjusted solution, the reaction to national lending conditions remains remarkably optimal.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameJournal of Macroeconomics
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol54en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissueBen
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2017
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages306-331en
dc.relation.isversionofdoi10.1016/j.jmacro.2017.04.010en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie internationaleen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.relation.forthcomingprintnonen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenonen
dc.description.halcandidateouien
dc.description.readershiprechercheen
dc.description.audienceInternationalen
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedouien
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedouien
dc.date.updated2018-03-28T11:23:55Z
hal.faultCode{"duplicate-entry":{"halshs-01525396":{"doi":"1.0"}}}
hal.author.functionaut
hal.author.functionaut


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