Evaluationwise strategy-proofness

Erdamar, Bora; Sanver, Remzi; Sato, Shin

Erdamar, Bora; Sanver, Remzi; Sato, Shin (2017), Evaluationwise strategy-proofness, Games and Economic Behavior, 106, p. 227-238. 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.010

Type

Article accepté pour publication ou publié

Date

2017

Journal name

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume

106

Publisher

Elsevier

Pages

227-238

Abstract (EN)

We consider manipulation of collective decision making rules in a framework where voters not only rank candidates but also evaluate them as “acceptable” or “unacceptable”. In this richer informational setting, we adopt a new notion of strategy-proofness, called evaluationwise strategy-proofness, where incentives of manipulation exist if and only if a voter can replace an outcome which he finds unacceptable with an acceptable one. Evaluationwise strategy-proofness is weaker than strategy-proofness. However, we establish the prevalence of a logical incompatibility between evaluationwise strategy-proofness, anonymity and efficiency. On the other hand, we show possibility results when either anonymity or efficiency is weakened.

Subjects / Keywords

Approval voting; Efficiency; Evaluationwise strategy-proofness; Preference-approval; Strategy-proofness

JEL

D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design