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Object Allocation via Swaps along a Social Network

Gourvès, Laurent; Lesca, Julien; Wilczynski, Anaëlle (2017), Object Allocation via Swaps along a Social Network, in Sierra, Carles, Proceedings of the the 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI’17), AAAI Press / IJCAI : Palo Alto (USA), p. 213-219. 10.24963/ijcai.2017/31

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Type
Communication / Conférence
Date
2017
Conference title
26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI’17)
Conference date
2017-08
Conference city
Melbourne
Conference country
Australia
Book title
Proceedings of the the 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI’17)
Book author
Sierra, Carles
Publisher
AAAI Press / IJCAI
Published in
Palo Alto (USA)
ISBN
978-0-9992411-0-3
Pages
213-219
Publication identifier
Metadata
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Author(s)
Gourvès, Laurent
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Lesca, Julien
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Wilczynski, Anaëlle cc
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Abstract (EN)
This article deals with object allocation where each agent receives a single item. Starting from an initial endowment, the agents can be better off by exchanging their objects. However, not all trades are likely because some participants are unable to communicate. By considering that the agents are embedded in a social network, we propose to study the allocations emerging from a sequence of simple swaps between pairs of neighbors in the network. This model raises natural questions regarding (i) the reachability of a given assignment, (ii) the ability of an agent to obtain a given object, and (iii) the search of Pareto-efficient allocations. We investigate the complexity of these problems by providing, according to the structure of the social network, polynomial and NP-complete cases.
Subjects / Keywords
Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems; Coordination and cooperation; Social Choice Theory