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Implementation Via Approval Mechanisms

Nunez, Matias; Xefteris, Dimitrios (2017), Implementation Via Approval Mechanisms, Journal of Economic Theory, 170, p. 169-181. 10.1016/j.jet.2017.05.003

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IMPLEMENTATION_VIA_APPROVAL_MECHANISMS.pdf (245.8Kb)
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2017
Journal name
Journal of Economic Theory
Volume
170
Publisher
Elsevier
Pages
169-181
Publication identifier
10.1016/j.jet.2017.05.003
Metadata
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Author(s)
Nunez, Matias
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Xefteris, Dimitrios
University of Cyprus [UCY]
Abstract (EN)
We focus on the single-peaked domain and study the class of Generalized Approval Mechanisms (GAMs): First, players simultaneously select subsets of the outcome space and scores are assigned to each alternative; and, then, a given quantile of the induced score distribution is implemented. Our main finding is that essentially for every Nash-implementable welfare optimum – including the Condorcet winner alternative – there exists a GAM that Nash-implements it. Importantly, the GAM that Nash-implements the Condorcet winner alternative is the first simple simultaneous game with this feature in the literature.
Subjects / Keywords
Nash Implementation; Strategy-proofness; Approval Voting; Single-Peakedness; Condorcet winner
JEL
C90 - General
D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
H41 - Public Goods

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