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Implementation Via Approval Mechanisms

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IMPLEMENTATION_VIA_APPROVAL_MECHANISMS.pdf (245.8Kb)
Date
2017
Dewey
Recherche opérationnelle
Sujet
Nash Implementation; Strategy-proofness; Approval Voting; Single-Peakedness; Condorcet winner
JEL code
C.C9.C90; D.D7.D71; D.D7.D78; H.H4.H41
Journal issue
Journal of Economic Theory
Volume
170
Publication date
07-2017
Article pages
169-181
Publisher
Elsevier
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.05.003
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/17468
Collections
  • LAMSADE : Publications
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Author
Nunez, Matias
989 Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Xefteris, Dimitrios
239615 University of Cyprus [UCY]
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
We focus on the single-peaked domain and study the class of Generalized Approval Mechanisms (GAMs): First, players simultaneously select subsets of the outcome space and scores are assigned to each alternative; and, then, a given quantile of the induced score distribution is implemented. Our main finding is that essentially for every Nash-implementable welfare optimum – including the Condorcet winner alternative – there exists a GAM that Nash-implements it. Importantly, the GAM that Nash-implements the Condorcet winner alternative is the first simple simultaneous game with this feature in the literature.

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