Dominance solvable approval voting games

Courtin, Sébastien; Nunez, Matias

Courtin, Sébastien; Nunez, Matias (2017), Dominance solvable approval voting games, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 19, 6, p. 1055-1076. 10.1111/jpet.12251

Type

Article accepté pour publication ou publié

Date

2017

Journal name

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volume

Number

Publisher

Wiley

Pages

1055-1076

Centre de recherche en économie et management [CREM]
Nunez, Matias
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]

Abstract (EN)

This work provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the dominance solvability of approval voting games. Our conditions are very simple since they depend just on the number of possible winners when voters play weakly undominated strategies. If there are at most two possible winners, then the game is dominance-solvable and the outcome coincides with the Condorcet winner. If every candidate is a possible winner, the game is not dominance-solvable. If none of the previous conditions holds, then the game need not be dominance-solvable, and the outcome need not coincide with the Condorcet winner.

Subjects / Keywords

Approval voting; Strategic voting; Dominance-solvability; Condorcet Winner

JEL

D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
C72 - Noncooperative Games