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Reaching consensus through approval bargaining

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Date
2017
Dewey
Probabilités et mathématiques appliquées
Sujet
Approval voting; Bargaining; Partial honesty; Consensual equilibrium
JEL code
C.C7.C72
Journal issue
Games and Economic Behavior
Volume
104
Publication date
07-2017
Article pages
241-251
Publisher
Elsevier
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.002
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/17460
Collections
  • LAMSADE : Publications
Metadata
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Author
Laslier, Jean-François
139754 Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques [PSE]
Nunez, Matias
989 Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Pimienta, Carlos
520336 UNSW Business School
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
In the Approval Bargaining game, two players bargain over a finite set of alternatives. To this end, each one simultaneously submits a utility function u jointly with a real number α; by doing so she approves the lotteries whose expected utility according to u is at least α. The lottery to be implemented is randomly selected among the most approved ones. We first prove that there is an equilibrium where players truthfully reveal their utility function. We also show that, in any equilibrium, the equilibrium outcome is approved by both players. Finally, every equilibrium is sincere and Pareto efficient as long as both players are partially honest.

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