Abstract (EN)

This article gives an overview of several challenges studied in deontic logic, with an emphasis on challenges involving agents. We start with traditional modal deontic logic using preferences to address the challenge of contrary-to-duty reasoning, and STIT theory addressing the challenges of non-deterministic actions, moral luck and procrastination. Then we turn to alternative norm-based deontic logics detaching obligations from norms to address the challenge of Jørgensen’s dilemma, including the question how to derive obligations from a normative system when agents cannot assume that other agents comply with their norms. We discuss also some traditional challenges from the viewpoint of normative systems: when a set of norms may be termed ‘coherent’, how to deal with normative conflicts, how to combine normative systems and traditional deontic logic, how various kinds of permission can be accommodated, how meaning postulates and counts-as conditionals can be taken into account, how sets of norms may be revised and merged, and how normative systems can be combined with game theory. The normative systems perspective means that norms, not ideality or preference, should take the central position in deontic semantics, and that a semantics that represents norms explicitly provides a helpful tool for analysing, clarifying and solving the problems of deontic logic. We focus on the challenges rather than trying to give full coverage of related work, for which we refer to the handbook of deontic logic and normative systems.