• français
    • English
  • English 
    • français
    • English
  • Login
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.
BIRD Home

Browse

This CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsJournals BIRDResearch centres & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsJournals

My Account

Login

Statistics

View Usage Statistics

Rule enforcement among peers : A lateral control regime

Thumbnail
Date
2000
Dewey
Sociologie économique
Sujet
Lateral control; Collegial organization; Social control; Lateral control; Network analysis; Three way data
JEL code
Z13; A14
Journal issue
Organization Studies
Volume
21
Number
1
Publication date
01-2000
Article pages
193-214
Publisher
Sage
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0170840600211003
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/1713
Collections
  • IRISSO : Publications
Metadata
Show full item record
Author
Lazega, Emmanuel
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of control among peers. Drawing on a network study of a medium-sized Northeastern U.S. corporate law firm, this work shows that partners — all formally equal and locked in a cooperative situation — have developed an informal `lateral control regime' to help protect their common interests against free loading due to individual expressive problems. This regime helps peers exercise early monitoring and sanctioning by reducing costs of control. It maintains low costs through appropriate use of social resources or `relationships' between members. Sanctioners are chosen because they are structurally close to the infractors, but often also because they are relatively more powerful. Some of the costs of control are shown to be shifted to partners with a specific form of status within the firm, that of uncontroversial `protectors of the common good'. These main sanctioners help prevent situations in which infractors would be reserved preferential treatment because they control resources too important to their close partners.

  • Accueil Bibliothèque
  • Site de l'Université Paris-Dauphine
  • Contact
SCD Paris Dauphine - Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny 75775 Paris Cedex 16

 Content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.0 France (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) license.