• xmlui.mirage2.page-structure.header.title
    • français
    • English
  • Help
  • Login
  • Language 
    • Français
    • English
View Item 
  •   BIRD Home
  • LEDa (UMR CNRS 8007, UMR IRD 260)
  • LEDa : Publications
  • View Item
  •   BIRD Home
  • LEDa (UMR CNRS 8007, UMR IRD 260)
  • LEDa : Publications
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Browse

BIRDResearch centres & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesTypeThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesType

My Account

LoginRegister

Statistics

Most Popular ItemsStatistics by CountryMost Popular Authors
Thumbnail

Correlated equilibria and communication in games

Forges, Françoise (2012), Correlated equilibria and communication in games, in Meyers, Robert A., Computational Complexity. Theory, Techniques, and Applications, Springer : Berlin, p. 295-704. 10.1007/978-1-4614-1800-9_45

View/Open
Version non publiée (155.4Kb)
Type
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Date
2012
Book title
Computational Complexity. Theory, Techniques, and Applications
Book author
Meyers, Robert A.
Publisher
Springer
Published in
Berlin
ISBN
978-0-387-69572-3
Number of pages
3492
Pages
295-704
Publication identifier
10.1007/978-1-4614-1800-9_45
Metadata
Show full item record
Author(s)
Forges, Françoise
Abstract (EN)
The correlated equilibrium is a game theoretic solution concept. It was proposed by Aumann (1974, 1987) in order to capture the strategic corre- lation opportunities that the players face when they take into account the extraneous environment in which they interact. The notion is illustrated in Section II. A formal definition is given in Section III. The correlated equilibrium also appears as the appropriate solution concept if preplay communi- cation is allowed between the players. As shown in Section IV, this property can be given several precise statements according to the constraints imposed on the playersícommunication, which can go from plain conversation to ex- change of messages through noisy channels. Originally designed for static games with complete information, the correlated equilibrium applies to any strategic form game. It is geometrically and computationally more tractable than the better known Nash equilibrium. The solution concept has been extended to dynamic games, possibly with incomplete information. As an illustration, we define in details the communication equilibrium for Bayesian games in Section V.
Subjects / Keywords
Analyse bayésienne; Théorie des jeux; Information privée
JEL
C70 - General
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

Related items

Showing items related by title and author.

  • Thumbnail
    Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk : the Two-Player Case 
    Forges, Françoise; Vida, Péter (2013-01) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
  • Thumbnail
    Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited 
    Forges, Françoise (2006-08) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
  • Thumbnail
    Communication in Bayesian games: Overview of work on implementing mediators in game theory 
    Forges, Françoise (2010) Communication / Conférence
  • Thumbnail
    Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies 
    Forges, Françoise; Heifetz, Aviad; Minelli, Enrico (2001) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
  • Thumbnail
    Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types 
    Forges, Françoise; Koessler, Frédéric (2005) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Dauphine PSL Bibliothèque logo
Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny 75775 Paris Cedex 16
Phone: 01 44 05 40 94
Contact
Dauphine PSL logoEQUIS logoCreative Commons logo