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The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignement game

Forges, Françoise (2004), The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignement game, Mathematical Social Sciences, 47, 2, p. 135-151. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.07.004

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Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2004
Journal name
Mathematical Social Sciences
Volume
47
Number
2
Publisher
Elsevier
Pages
135-151
Publication identifier
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Author(s)
Forges, Françoise
Abstract (EN)
We consider two-sided matching markets in which agents have private information on a state of nature which determines the agents' utilities of matching. Monetary transfers are allowed and utility functions are quasi-linear. The model thus extends the assignment game introduced by Shapley and Shubik. We prove that the ex ante incentive compatible core and the (interim) incentive compatible coarse core of the matching game are both non-empty.
Subjects / Keywords
Théorie des jeux; Information privée; jeux coopératifs
JEL
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
C71 - Cooperative Games