
The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignement game
Forges, Françoise (2004), The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignement game, Mathematical Social Sciences, 47, 2, p. 135-151. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.07.004
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Article accepté pour publication ou publiéDate
2004Journal name
Mathematical Social SciencesVolume
47Number
2Publisher
Elsevier
Pages
135-151
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Forges, FrançoiseAbstract (EN)
We consider two-sided matching markets in which agents have private information on a state of nature which determines the agents' utilities of matching. Monetary transfers are allowed and utility functions are quasi-linear. The model thus extends the assignment game introduced by Shapley and Shubik. We prove that the ex ante incentive compatible core and the (interim) incentive compatible coarse core of the matching game are both non-empty.Subjects / Keywords
Théorie des jeux; Information privée; jeux coopératifsRelated items
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