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The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignement game

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Forges WP 26.pdf (183.5Kb)
Date
2004
Notes
La version attachée à cette notice est une version working paper
Dewey
Economie politique
Sujet
Théorie des jeux; Information privée; jeux coopératifs
JEL code
D82; C78; C71
Journal issue
Mathematical Social Sciences
Volume
47
Number
2
Publication date
03-2004
Article pages
135-151
Publisher
Elsevier
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.07.004
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/169
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  • CEREMADE : Publications
  • LEDa : Publications
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Author
Forges, Françoise
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
We consider two-sided matching markets in which agents have private information on a state of nature which determines the agents' utilities of matching. Monetary transfers are allowed and utility functions are quasi-linear. The model thus extends the assignment game introduced by Shapley and Shubik. We prove that the ex ante incentive compatible core and the (interim) incentive compatible coarse core of the matching game are both non-empty.

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