
Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
Forges, Françoise; Koessler, Frédéric (2005), Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 41, 7, p. 793-811. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.12.006
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Article accepté pour publication ou publiéDate
2005Journal name
Journal of Mathematical EconomicsVolume
41Number
7Pages
793-811
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Show full item recordAbstract (EN)
This paper studies the set of equilibria that can be achieved by adding general communication systems to Bayesian games in which some information can be certified or, equivalently, in which players’ types are partially verifiable. Certifiability of information is formalized by a set of available reports for each player that varies with the true state of the world. Given these state-dependent sets of reports, we characterize canonical equilibria for which generalized versions of the revelation principle are valid. Communication equilibria and associated canonical representations are obtained as special cases when no information can be certified.Subjects / Keywords
Information privée; Théorie des jeux; Analyse bayésienneRelated items
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