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Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types

Forges, Françoise; Koessler, Frédéric (2005), Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 41, 7, p. 793-811. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.12.006

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Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2005
Journal name
Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume
41
Number
7
Pages
793-811
Publication identifier
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.12.006
Metadata
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Author(s)
Forges, Françoise
Koessler, Frédéric cc
Abstract (EN)
This paper studies the set of equilibria that can be achieved by adding general communication systems to Bayesian games in which some information can be certified or, equivalently, in which players’ types are partially verifiable. Certifiability of information is formalized by a set of available reports for each player that varies with the true state of the world. Given these state-dependent sets of reports, we characterize canonical equilibria for which generalized versions of the revelation principle are valid. Communication equilibria and associated canonical representations are obtained as special cases when no information can be certified.
Subjects / Keywords
Information privée; Théorie des jeux; Analyse bayésienne
JEL
C72 - Noncooperative Games
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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