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Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments

Forges, Françoise (2006), Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments, Social Choice and Welfare, 26, 2, p. 403-419. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0107-1

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Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2006-04
Journal name
Social Choice and Welfare
Volume
26
Number
2
Publisher
Springer
Pages
403-419
Publication identifier
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0107-1
Metadata
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Author(s)
Forges, Françoise
Abstract (EN)
We propose two classes of allocation games for N.T.U. and T.U. exchange economies in which initial endowments and preferences depend on the agents’ private information. In both models, agents make non-verifiable claims about their types and effective deposits of consumption goods, which are redistributed by the planner. In a W-allocation game, the agents can withhold part of their endowment, namely consume whatever they do not deposit. In a D-allocation game, the agents can just destroypart of their endowment. W- and D- incentive compatible (I.C.) direct allocation mechanisms ask every agent to reveal his type and to make a deposit consistent with his reported type. The revelation principle holds in full generality for D-I.C. mechanisms but some care is needed for W-I.C. mechanisms. We further investigate the properties of both classes of mechanisms under common assumptions like non-exclusive information and/or constant aggregate endowment. In T.U. economies, W-I.C. and D-I.C. mechanisms are ex ante equivalent.
Subjects / Keywords
Théorie des jeux
JEL
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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