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Electoral Thresholds as Coordination Devices

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Date
2017
Dewey
Probabilités et mathématiques appliquées
Sujet
strategic voting; entry thresholds; Poisson games
Journal issue
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
Volume
119
Number
2
Publication date
03-2017
Article pages
346-374
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12175
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/16562
Collections
  • LAMSADE : Publications
Metadata
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Author
Nunez, Matias
989 Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Xefteris, Dimitrios
239615 University of Cyprus [UCY]
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
This paper studies one-person-one-vote parliamentary elections where voters care both about the winner of elections and about the composition of the parliament. Parties enter the parliament if and only if their vote share exceeds some predetermined threshold. We show a) that there generically exist equilibria in which all parties get a non-degenerate vote-share and, perhaps more importantly, b) that the size of the electoral threshold acts as a coordination device which crucially affects the win prospects of the Condorcet winner party. In particular we argue that the win prospects of the Condorcet winner party are decreasing in the size of the entry threshold.

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