Large Spatial Competition

Nunez, Matias; Scarsini, Marco

Nunez, Matias; Scarsini, Marco (2017), Large Spatial Competition, dans Mallozzi, Lina; D'Amato, Egidio; Pardalos, Panos M, Spatial Interaction Models: Facility Location Using Game Theory, Springer International Publishing, p. 225-246. 10.1007/978-3-319-52654-6_10

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Type

Chapitre d'ouvrage

Date

2017

Titre de l'ouvrage

Spatial Interaction Models: Facility Location Using Game Theory

Auteurs de l’ouvrage

Mallozzi, Lina; D'Amato, Egidio; Pardalos, Panos M

Éditeur

Springer International Publishing

Titre de la collection

Springer Optimization and Its Applications (vol. 118)

Isbn

978-3-319-52653-9

Nombre de pages

327

Pages

225-246

Identifiant publication

10.1007/978-3-319-52654-6_10

Métadonnées

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Auteur(s)

Nunez, Matias
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Scarsini, Marco
Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza

Résumé (EN)

We consider spatial competition when consumers are arbitrarily distributed on a compact metric space. Retailers can choose one of finitely many locations in this space. We focus on symmetric mixed equilibria which exist for any number of retailers. We prove that the distribution of retailers tends to agree with the distribution of the consumers when the number of competitors is large enough. The results are shown to be robust to the introduction of (i) randomness in the number of retailers and (ii) different ability of the retailers to attract consumers.