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Large Spatial Competition

Nunez, Matias; Scarsini, Marco (2017), Large Spatial Competition, in Mallozzi, Lina; D'Amato, Egidio; Pardalos, Panos M, Spatial Interaction Models: Facility Location Using Game Theory, Springer International Publishing, p. 225-246. 10.1007/978-3-319-52654-6_10

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Type
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Date
2017
Book title
Spatial Interaction Models: Facility Location Using Game Theory
Book author
Mallozzi, Lina; D'Amato, Egidio; Pardalos, Panos M
Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Series title
Springer Optimization and Its Applications (vol. 118)
ISBN
978-3-319-52653-9
Number of pages
327
Pages
225-246
Publication identifier
Metadata
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Author(s)
Nunez, Matias
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Scarsini, Marco
Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza
Abstract (EN)
We consider spatial competition when consumers are arbitrarily distributed on a compact metric space. Retailers can choose one of finitely many locations in this space. We focus on symmetric mixed equilibria which exist for any number of retailers. We prove that the distribution of retailers tends to agree with the distribution of the consumers when the number of competitors is large enough. The results are shown to be robust to the introduction of (i) randomness in the number of retailers and (ii) different ability of the retailers to attract consumers.
Subjects / Keywords
Location; Equilibrium; Hotelling games; Large games; Poisson games; Valence
JEL
C72 - Noncooperative Games
R30 - General
R39 - Other