Large Spatial Competition
Nunez, Matias; Scarsini, Marco (2017), Large Spatial Competition, in Mallozzi, Lina; D'Amato, Egidio; Pardalos, Panos M, Spatial Interaction Models: Facility Location Using Game Theory, Springer International Publishing, p. 225-246. 10.1007/978-3-319-52654-6_10
Book titleSpatial Interaction Models: Facility Location Using Game Theory
Book authorMallozzi, Lina; D'Amato, Egidio; Pardalos, Panos M
Series titleSpringer Optimization and Its Applications (vol. 118)
Number of pages327
MetadataShow full item record
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza
Abstract (EN)We consider spatial competition when consumers are arbitrarily distributed on a compact metric space. Retailers can choose one of finitely many locations in this space. We focus on symmetric mixed equilibria which exist for any number of retailers. We prove that the distribution of retailers tends to agree with the distribution of the consumers when the number of competitors is large enough. The results are shown to be robust to the introduction of (i) randomness in the number of retailers and (ii) different ability of the retailers to attract consumers.
Subjects / KeywordsLocation; Equilibrium; Hotelling games; Large games; Poisson games; Valence
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