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Absolute qualified majoritarianism: how does the threshold matter?

Ozkes, Ali Ihsan; Sanver, Remzi (2017), Absolute qualified majoritarianism: how does the threshold matter?, Economics Letters, 153, p. 20-22. 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.027

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
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https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01416727
Date
2017
Nom de la revue
Economics Letters
Volume
153
Éditeur
Elsevier
Pages
20-22
Identifiant publication
Métadonnées
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Auteur(s)
Ozkes, Ali Ihsan
Sanver, Remzi
Résumé (EN)
We study absolute qualified majority rules in a setting with more than two alternatives. We show that given two qualified majority rules, if transitivity is desired for the societal outcome and if the thresholds of one of these rules are at least as high as the other’s for any pair of alternatives, then at each preference profile the rule with higher thresholds results in a coarser social ranking. Hence all absolute qualified majority rules can be expressed as specific coarsenings of the simple majority rule.
Mots-clés
simple majority rule; qualified majority rules