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The Lazy Bureaucrat Problem with Common Arrivals and Deadlines: Approximation and Mechanism Design

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Date
2013
Notes
in Springer series Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 8070
Dewey
Recherche opérationnelle
Sujet
optimisation combinatoire
JEL code
C.C4.C44
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40164-0_18
Conference name
19th International Symposium, FCT 2013
Conference date
08-2013
Conference city
Liverpool
Conference country
United Kingdom
Book title
Fundamentals of Computation Theory
Author
Gąsieniec, Leszek Antoni; Wolter, Frank
Publisher
Springer
Publisher city
Berlin Heidelberg
Year
2013
Pages number
316
ISBN
978-3-642-40163-3
Book URL
10.1007/978-3-642-40164-0
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/16136
Collections
  • LAMSADE : Publications
Metadata
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Author
Gourvès, Laurent
989 Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Monnot, Jérôme
989 Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Pagourtzis, Aris T.
245158 School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, National Technical University of Athens [ICCS]
Type
Communication / Conférence
Item number of pages
171-182
Abstract (EN)
We study the Lazy Bureaucrat scheduling problem (Arkin, Bender, Mitchell and Skiena [1]) in the case of common arrivals and deadlines. In this case the goal is to select a subset of given jobs in such a way that the total processing time is minimized and no other job can fit into the schedule. Our contribution comprises a linear time 4/3-approximation algorithm and an FPTAS, which respectively improve on a linear time 2-approximation algorithm and a PTAS given for the more general case of common deadlines [2,3]. We then consider a selfish perspective, in which jobs are submitted by players who may falsely report larger processing times, and show a tight upper bound of 2 on the approximation ratio of strategyproof mechanisms, even randomized ones. We conclude by introducing a maximization version of the problem and a dedicated greedy algorithm.

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