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dc.contributor.authorGourvès, Laurent*
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-06T15:36:33Z
dc.date.available2017-01-06T15:36:33Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/16133
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectAlgorithmic game theory
dc.subjectEquilibrium
dc.subjectGroup deviation
dc.subject.ddc006.3en
dc.titleProfitable Deviation Strong Equilibria
dc.typeCommunication / Conférence
dc.description.abstractenThis paper deals with states that are immune to group deviations. Group deviations help the players of a strategic game to escape from undesirable states but they compromise the stability of a system. We propose and analyse a solution concept, called profitable deviation strong equilibrium, which is between two well-known equilibria: the strong equilibrium and the super strong equilibrium. The former precludes joint deviations by groups of players who all benefit. The latter is more demanding in the sense that at least one member of a deviating coalition must be better off while the other members cannot be worst off. We study the existence, computation and convergence to a profitable deviation strong equilibrium in three important games in algorithmic game theory: job scheduling, max cut and singleton congestion game.
dc.identifier.citationpages236-252
dc.relation.ispartoftitleAlgorithmic Decision Theory - 4th International Conference, ADT 2015, Lexington, KY, USA, September 27-30, 2015, Proceedings
dc.relation.ispartofeditorToby Walsh
dc.relation.ispartofpublnameSpringer
dc.relation.ispartofpublcityBerlin Heidelberg
dc.relation.ispartofdate2015
dc.relation.ispartofurl10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3
dc.subject.ddclabelIntelligence artificielleen
dc.relation.ispartofisbn978-3-319-23113-6
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_15
dc.description.ssrncandidatenon
dc.description.halcandidateoui
dc.description.readershiprecherche
dc.description.audienceInternational
dc.date.updated2017-01-06T15:37:47Z
hal.person.labIds989*
hal.identifierhal-01428954*


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