Date
2015
Dewey
Recherche opérationnelle
Sujet
Mechanism Design; Exchange; Top-Trading-Cycles; Core; Splittings; Complexity
JEL code
C.C4.C44
Book title
Proceedings of the 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI’15)
Publisher
AAAI Press
Publisher city
Palo Alto (USA)
Year
2015
ISBN
978-1-57735-698-1
Author
Lesca, Julien
Fujita, Etsushi
Sonoda, Akihisa
Todo, Taiki
Yokoo, Makoto
Type
Communication / Conférence
Item number of pages
907-913
Abstract (EN)
Core-selection is a crucial property of social choice functions, or rules, in social choice literature. It is also desirable to address the incentive of agents to cheat by misreporting their preferences. This paper investigates an exchange problem where each agent may have multiple indivisible goods, agents’ preferences over sets of goods are assumed to be lexicographic, and side payments are not allowed. We propose an exchange rule called augmented top-trading-cycles (ATTC) procedure based on the original TTC procedure. We first show that the ATTC procedure is core-selecting. We then show that finding a beneficial misreport under the ATTC procedure is NP-hard. Under the ATTC procedure, we finally clarify the relationship between preference misreport and splitting, which is a different type of manipulation.