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dc.contributor.authorEttinger, David
dc.contributor.authorMichelucci, Fabio
dc.date.accessioned2016-12-08T09:39:30Z
dc.date.available2016-12-08T09:39:30Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.issn0013-0133
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/16077
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectefficiencyen
dc.subjectjump bidsen
dc.subjectauctionsen
dc.subject.ddc338.5en
dc.subject.classificationjelD.D4.D44en
dc.subject.classificationjelD.D8.D82en
dc.titleHiding Information in Open Auctions with Jump Bidsen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenWe analyse a rationale for hiding information in open ascending auction formats. We focus on the incentives for a bidder to call a price higher than the highest standing one in order to prevent the remaining active bidders from aggregating more accurate information by observing the exact dropout values of the opponents who exit the auction. We show that the decision whether to allow jump bids or not can have a drastic impact on revenue and efficiency.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameThe Economic Journal
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol126en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue594en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2016
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages1484–1502en
dc.relation.isversionofdoi10.1111/ecoj.12243en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherWileyen
dc.subject.ddclabelMicroéconomieen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.relation.forthcomingprintnonen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenonen
dc.description.halcandidateouien
dc.description.readershiprechercheen
dc.description.audienceInternationalen
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedouien
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedouien
dc.date.updated2016-12-08T09:29:56Z
hal.person.labIds163511
hal.person.labIds110463
hal.identifierhal-01412208*


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