Hiding Information in Open Auctions with Jump Bids

Ettinger, David; Michelucci, Fabio

Ettinger, David; Michelucci, Fabio (2016), Hiding Information in Open Auctions with Jump Bids, The Economic Journal, 126, 594, p. 1484–1502. 10.1111/ecoj.12243

Type

Article accepté pour publication ou publié

Date

2016

Nom de la revue

The Economic Journal

Volume

126

Numéro

594

Éditeur

Wiley

Pages

1484–1502

Identifiant publication

10.1111/ecoj.12243

Métadonnées

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Auteur(s)

Ettinger, David
Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa]
Michelucci, Fabio
CERGE-EI

Résumé (EN)

We analyse a rationale for hiding information in open ascending auction formats. We focus on the incentives for a bidder to call a price higher than the highest standing one in order to prevent the remaining active bidders from aggregating more accurate information by observing the exact dropout values of the opponents who exit the auction. We show that the decision whether to allow jump bids or not can have a drastic impact on revenue and efficiency.