Hiding Information in Open Auctions with Jump Bids
Ettinger, David; Michelucci, Fabio (2016), Hiding Information in Open Auctions with Jump Bids, The Economic Journal, 126, 594, p. 1484–1502. 10.1111/ecoj.12243
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publiéDate
2016Journal name
The Economic JournalVolume
126Number
594Publisher
Wiley
Pages
1484–1502
Publication identifier
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract (EN)
We analyse a rationale for hiding information in open ascending auction formats. We focus on the incentives for a bidder to call a price higher than the highest standing one in order to prevent the remaining active bidders from aggregating more accurate information by observing the exact dropout values of the opponents who exit the auction. We show that the decision whether to allow jump bids or not can have a drastic impact on revenue and efficiency.Subjects / Keywords
efficiency; jump bids; auctionsRelated items
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