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Hiding Information in Open Auctions with Jump Bids

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Date
2016
Dewey
Microéconomie
Sujet
efficiency; jump bids; auctions
JEL code
D.D4.D44; D.D8.D82
Journal issue
The Economic Journal
Volume
126
Number
594
Publication date
2016
Article pages
1484–1502
Publisher
Wiley
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12243
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/16077
Collections
  • LEDa : Publications
Metadata
Show full item record
Author
Ettinger, David
163511 Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa]
Michelucci, Fabio
110463 CERGE-EI
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
We analyse a rationale for hiding information in open ascending auction formats. We focus on the incentives for a bidder to call a price higher than the highest standing one in order to prevent the remaining active bidders from aggregating more accurate information by observing the exact dropout values of the opponents who exit the auction. We show that the decision whether to allow jump bids or not can have a drastic impact on revenue and efficiency.

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