Hiding Information in Open Auctions with Jump Bids
Ettinger, David; Michelucci, Fabio (2016), Hiding Information in Open Auctions with Jump Bids, The Economic Journal, 126, 594, p. 1484–1502. 10.1111/ecoj.12243
TypeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
Journal nameThe Economic Journal
MetadataShow full item record
Abstract (EN)We analyse a rationale for hiding information in open ascending auction formats. We focus on the incentives for a bidder to call a price higher than the highest standing one in order to prevent the remaining active bidders from aggregating more accurate information by observing the exact dropout values of the opponents who exit the auction. We show that the decision whether to allow jump bids or not can have a drastic impact on revenue and efficiency.
Subjects / Keywordsefficiency; jump bids; auctions
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