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dc.contributor.authorAtal, Vidya
dc.contributor.authorBar, Talia
dc.contributor.authorGordon, Sidartha
dc.date.accessioned2016-12-05T13:52:34Z
dc.date.available2016-12-05T13:52:34Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/16062
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectProject selectionen
dc.subjectSearchen
dc.subjectCommitmenten
dc.subjectMarkov perfect equilibriumen
dc.subject.ddc338en
dc.subject.classificationjelL.L1.L13en
dc.subject.classificationjelL.L1.L10en
dc.subject.classificationjelD.D2.D21en
dc.titleProject selection: Commitment and competitionen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherDepartment of Economics, University of Connecticut;United States
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherDepartment of Economics and Finance, Montclair State University;United States
dc.description.abstractenWe examine project selection decisions of firms constrained in the number of projects they can handle at once. A new project opportunity arises every period. Taking on a project requires a commitment of uncertain duration, preventing the firm from selecting another project in subsequent periods until the commitment ends. In our dynamic game, when two firms are free of commitment, they move sequentially in random order. Symmetric pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria always exist. In equilibrium, the first mover strategically rejects some projects that are then selected by the second mover, even when the value of the project is the same for both firms. A monopolist rejects more projects, and adopts ones of higher average quality compared to the duopolist. Duopolists select too few projects compared to their jointly optimal behavior. We extend the model to allow for externalities, asymmetry, and n>2n>2 firms.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameGames and Economic Behavior
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol96en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2016
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages30-48en
dc.relation.isversionofdoi10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.011en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherAcademic Pressen
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie industrielleen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.relation.forthcomingprintnonen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenonen
dc.description.halcandidateouien
dc.description.readershiprechercheen
dc.description.audienceInternationalen
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedouien
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedouien
dc.date.updated2016-12-05T13:34:48Z
hal.person.labIds
hal.person.labIds111390
hal.person.labIds163511
hal.identifierhal-01408902*


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