Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behaviour
Gordon, Sidartha; Riboni, Alessandro (2015), Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behaviour, The Economic Journal, 125, 589, p. 1790-1817. 10.1111/ecoj.12326
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publiéDate
2015Journal name
The Economic JournalVolume
125Number
589Publisher
Macmillan
Pages
1790-1817
Publication identifier
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract (EN)
We consider a conflict under incomplete information where two opponents fight to impose their preferred policy. Before the conflict, one opponent (the agent) trusts the information received by his principal. Under some conditions, the principal induces hawkish attitudes in the agent: the agent never doubts the optimality of his preferred policy, conflicts are violent, and bad decisions are sometimes made. Under other conditions, the agent believes that his opponent may be right, even when all evidence indicates that the policy preferred by the opponent is certainly suboptimal. In this case, the agent adopts dovish attitudes and conflicts are less violent.Subjects / Keywords
Conflict; communication; naive agents; dogmatismRelated items
Showing items related by title and author.
-
Riboni, Alessandro (2011-01) Document de travail / Working paper
-
Riboni, Alessandro; Ruge-Murcia, Francesco (2008-08) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
-
Riboni, Alessandro; Ruge-Murcia, Francesco (2011-05) Document de travail / Working paper
-
Riboni, Alessandro; Ruge-Murcia, Francesco (2008) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
-
Piguillem, Facundo; Riboni, Alessandro (2011-02) Document de travail / Working paper