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Strategic voting in a social context: considerate equilibria

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FAIA285-1423.pdf (296.9Kb)
Date
2016
Notes
Series Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, Volume 285
Dewey
Recherche opérationnelle
Sujet
Game theory; Social choice theory; Plurality; Antiplurality; Plurality with runoff; Borda; k-approval; STV; Maximin and Copeland.
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-1423
Conference name
ECAI 2016 - 22nd European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Conference date
08-2016
Conference city
The Hague
Conference country
Netherlands
Book title
ECAI 2016 - 22nd European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Author
Kaminka, Gal A.; Fox, Maria; Bouquet, Paolo; Hüllermeier, Eyke; Dignum, Virginia; Dignum, Frank; van Harmelen, Frank
Publisher
Ios Press
Year
2016
ISBN
978-1-61499-671-2
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/15922
Collections
  • LAMSADE : Publications
Metadata
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Author
Gourvès, Laurent
989 Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Lesca, Julien
989 Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Wilczynski, Anaëlle
989 Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Type
Communication / Conférence
Item number of pages
1423-1431
Abstract (EN)
In a voting system, voters may adopt a strategic behaviour in order to manipulate the outcome of the election. This naturally entails a game theoretic conception of voting. The specificity of our work is that we embed the voting game into a social context where agents and their relations are given by a graph, i.e. a social network. We aim at integrating the information provided by the graph in a refinement of the game-theotical analysis of an election. We consider coalitional equilibria immune to deviations performed by realistic coalitions based on the social network, namely the cliques of the graph. Agents are not fully selfish as they have consideration for their relatives. The corresponding notion of equilibrium was introduced by Hoefer et al. [12] and called considerate equilibrium. We propose to study its existence and the ability of the agents to converge to such an equilibrium in strategic voting games using well-known voting rules: Plurality, Antiplurality, Plurality with runoff, Borda, k-approval, STV, Maximin and Copeland.

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