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Optimal Reallocation under Additive and Ordinal Preferences

Aziz, Haris; Biro, Peter; Lang, Jérôme; Lesca, Julien; Monnot, Jérôme (2016), Optimal Reallocation under Additive and Ordinal Preferences, in Catholijn M. Jonker, Stacy Marsella, John Thangarajah, Karl Tuyls, AAMAS '16 Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents And Multiagent Systems, Singapore, May 9-13, 2016, IFAAMAS, p. 402-410

Type
Communication / Conférence
External document link
http://arxiv.org/abs/1604.01091v1
Date
2016
Book title
AAMAS '16 Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents And Multiagent Systems, Singapore, May 9-13, 2016
Book author
Catholijn M. Jonker, Stacy Marsella, John Thangarajah, Karl Tuyls
Publisher
IFAAMAS
ISBN
978-1-4503-4239-1
Pages
402-410
Metadata
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Author(s)
Aziz, Haris
Biro, Peter
Lang, Jérôme
Lesca, Julien
Monnot, Jérôme cc
Abstract (EN)
Reallocating resources to get mutually beneficial outcomes is a fundamental problem in various multi-agent settings. In the first part of the paper we focus on the setting in which agents express additive cardinal utilities over objects. We present computational hardness results as well as polynomial-time algorithms for testing Pareto optimality under different restrictions such as two utility values or lexicographic utilities. In the second part of the paper we assume that agents express only their (ordinal) preferences over single objects, and that their preferences are additively separable. In this setting, we present characterizations and polynomial-time algorithms for possible and necessary Pareto optimality.
Subjects / Keywords
Computational Social Choice; Indivisible goods; Pareto; Computational Complexity

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