Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited

dc.contributor.author	Forges, Françoise
dc.date.accessioned	2009-05-25T07:53:07Z
dc.date.available	2009-05-25T07:53:07Z
dc.date.issued	2006-08
dc.identifier.uri	https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/157
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.subject	Théorie des jeux	en
dc.subject	Analyse bayésienne	en
dc.subject.ddc	518	en
dc.subject.classificationjel	C11	en
dc.title	Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited	en
dc.type	Article accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.contributor.editoruniversityother	Paris Dauphine;France
dc.description.abstracten	A mistake in “Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium (CE) in games with incomplete information” motivates a re-examination of some extensions of the solution concept that Aumann introduced.	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlname	Theory and Decision
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol	61	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue	4	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate	2006-12
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages	329-344	en
dc.relation.isversionofdoi	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-006-9005-3	en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivate	oui	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisher	Springer	en
dc.subject.ddclabel	Modèles mathématiques. Algorithmes	en

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