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dc.contributor.authorForges, Françoise
dc.date.accessioned2009-05-25T07:53:07Z
dc.date.available2009-05-25T07:53:07Z
dc.date.issued2006-08
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/157
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectThéorie des jeuxen
dc.subjectAnalyse bayésienneen
dc.subject.ddc518en
dc.subject.classificationjelC11en
dc.titleCorrelated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisiteden
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherParis Dauphine;France
dc.description.abstractenA mistake in “Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium (CE) in games with incomplete information” motivates a re-examination of some extensions of the solution concept that Aumann introduced.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameTheory and Decision
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol61en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue4en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2006-12
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages329-344en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-006-9005-3en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherSpringeren
dc.subject.ddclabelModèles mathématiques. Algorithmesen


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