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dc.contributor.authorEttinger, David*
dc.contributor.authorMichelucci, Fabio*
dc.date.accessioned2015-06-26T12:42:12Z
dc.date.available2015-06-26T12:42:12Z
dc.date.issued2012-11
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/15288
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectAuctionsen
dc.subjectEfficiencyen
dc.subjectJump Bidsen
dc.subject.ddc338.5en
dc.subject.classificationjelD.D4.D44en
dc.subject.classificationjelD.D8.D82en
dc.titleHiding Information in Open Auctionsen
dc.typeCommunication / Conférence
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherCharles University in Prague
dc.description.abstractenWe analyze the rationale for hiding information in open auction formats. In particular, we focus on the incentives for a bidder to call a price higher than the highest standing one in order to prevent the remaining active bidders from aggregating more accurate information that could be gathered by observing the exact drop out values of the exiting bidders. Necessary conditions for the existence of jump bids with such motivations are provided. Finally, we show that there is no clear-cut effect of jump bids on efficiency and expected revenue and introduce several specific results.en
dc.identifier.citationpages40en
dc.identifier.urlsitehttp://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2175337
dc.contributor.countryeditoruniversityotherRépublique tchèque
dc.subject.ddclabelMicroéconomieen
dc.relation.conftitleEuropean Economic Association annual congressen
dc.relation.confdate2014-08
dc.relation.confcityToulouseen
dc.relation.confcountryFranceen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.description.halcandidateoui
dc.description.readershiprecherche
dc.description.audienceInternational
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewednon
hal.person.labIds163511*
hal.person.labIds110463*
hal.identifierhal-01458368*


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