Abstract (EN)

This paper assesses the relevance of the North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) framework to explain the performances of Burkina in terms of economic growth and development. The political history of Burkina has been very unstable until president Compaoré took power in 1987. Since then, stability has been based on low intensity violence, with bursts of open violence like those of the mutinies of 2011 or the final upheaval of 2014. This “stability” is based on the balance of power between two main “elite” groups, the Army and the traditional chiefs. Trade unions, the Catholic Church and donors also play a role, especially in case of trouble. The political class in power and its cronies are extracting rents by creating de facto monopolies, which enables them to tame violence, to a certain extent. The paradox is that the Burkinabe economy is growing steadily (GDP per capital grew at an average 1.5 per cent rate since independence), rather smoothly in the medium run – one of the best records in West-Africa. Because of high inequality, this impressive growth is far from inclusive.