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Judge: Don't Vote!

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cahier de recherche 2010-27-2.pdf (283.8Kb)
Date
2014
Dewey
Probabilités et mathématiques appliquées
Sujet
methods of electing and ranking; Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes; strategic manipulation; faithful representation; meaningful measurement; figure skating; presidential elections; jury decision
JEL code
C72; D71
Journal issue
Operations Research
Volume
62
Number
3
Publication date
2014
Article pages
483-511
Publisher
INFORMS
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1269
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/15122
Collections
  • CEREMADE : Publications
Metadata
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Author
Balinski, Michel
Laraki, Rida
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
This article argues that the traditional model of the theory of social choice is not a good model and does not lead to acceptable methods of ranking and electing. It presents a more meaningful and realistic model that leads naturally to a method of ranking and electing—majority judgment—that better meets the traditional criteria of what constitutes a good method. It gives descriptions of its successful use in several different practical situations and compares it with other methods including Condorcet's, Borda's, first-past-the-post, and approval voting.

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