| dc.contributor.author | Robert, Christian P. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-04-14T17:24:08Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2015-04-14T17:24:08Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/14937 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.subject | Bayesian inference | en |
| dc.subject | Testing statistical hypotheses | en |
| dc.subject | Type I error | en |
| dc.subject | significance level | en |
| dc.subject | p-value | en |
| dc.subject.ddc | 519 | en |
| dc.title | On the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox | en |
| dc.type | Article accepté pour publication ou publié | |
| dc.description.abstracten | This article discusses the dual interpretation of the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox associated with Bayesian posterior probabilities and Bayes factors, both as a differentiation between frequentist and Bayesian statistics and as a pointer to the difficulty of using improper priors while testing. I stress the considerable impact of this paradox on the foundations of both classical and Bayesian statistics. While assessing existing resolutions of the paradox, I focus on a critical viewpoint of the paradox discussed by Spanos in Philosophy of Science. | en |
| dc.relation.isversionofjnlname | Philosophy of Science | |
| dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol | 81 | en |
| dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue | 2 | en |
| dc.relation.isversionofjnldate | 2014 | |
| dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages | 216-232 | en |
| dc.relation.isversionofdoi | http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/675729 | en |
| dc.identifier.urlsite | http://arxiv.org/abs/1303.5973v3 | en |
| dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisher | Philosophy of Science Association | en |
| dc.subject.ddclabel | Probabilités et mathématiques appliquées | en |
| dc.relation.forthcoming | non | en |
| dc.relation.forthcomingprint | non | en |
