Supervision and Project Performance: A Principal-Agent Approach

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Date
2013Publisher city
ParisPublisher
Université Paris-DauphineCollection title
DIAL Document de travailCollection Id
DT/2015-04Dewey
Croissance et développement économiquesSujet
Théorie Principal-Agent; Projets d’aide; Supervision; Partenariats Difficiles; Principal-Agent theory; Aid projects; Supervision; Difficult partnershipsJEL code
D.D8.D86; F.F3.F35; O.O1.O19; O.O2.O22Collections
Metadata
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Chauvet, Lisa
status unknown
Collier, Paul
98120 Oxford University
Fuster, Andreas
245274 Federal Reserve Bank of New-York