Show simple item record

hal.structure.identifierCEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE]
dc.contributor.authorLaguzet, Laetitia
HAL ID: 10765
*
hal.structure.identifierInstitut Universitaire de France [IUF]
hal.structure.identifierCEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE]
dc.contributor.authorTurinici, Gabriel
HAL ID: 16
ORCID: 0000-0003-2713-006X
*
dc.date.accessioned2015-01-13T08:32:56Z
dc.date.available2015-01-13T08:32:56Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.issn0092-8240
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/14509
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectepidemic control
dc.subjectSIR model
dc.subjectindividual vaccination
dc.subjectmean field games
dc.subjectvaccine scares
dc.subjectNash equilibrium
dc.subject.ddc519en
dc.titleIndividual Vaccination as Nash Equilibrium in a SIR Model with Application to the 2009–2010 Influenza A(H1N1) Epidemic in France
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherInstitut Universitaire de France;France
dc.description.abstractenThe vaccination against ongoing epidemics is seldom compulsory but remains one of the most classical means to fight epidemic propagation. However, recent debates concerning the innocuity of vaccines and their risk with respect to the risk of the epidemic itself lead to severe vaccination campaign failures, and new mass behaviors appeared driven by individual self-interest. Prompted by this context, we analyze, in a Susceptible–Infected–Recovered model, whether egocentric individuals can reach an equilibrium with the rest of the society. Using techniques from the “Mean Field Games” theory, we extend previous results and show that an equilibrium exists and characterizes completely the individual best vaccination strategy (with or without discounting). We also compare with a strategy based only on overall societal optimization and exhibit a situation with nonnegative price of anarchy. Finally, we apply the theory to the 2009–2010 Influenza A (H1N1) vaccination campaign in France and hint that a group of individuals stopped vaccinating at levels that indicated a pessimistic perception of the risk of the vaccine.
dc.publisher.cityParisen
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameBulletin of mathematical biology
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol77
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue10
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2015
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages1955-1984
dc.relation.isversionofdoi10.1007/s11538-015-0111-7
dc.subject.ddclabelProbabilités et mathématiques appliquéesen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.relation.forthcomingprintnonen
dc.description.submittednonen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenon
dc.description.halcandidateoui
dc.description.readershiprecherche
dc.description.audienceInternational
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedoui
dc.date.updated2018-01-19T15:31:04Z
hal.author.functionaut
hal.author.functionaut


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record