• xmlui.mirage2.page-structure.header.title
    • français
    • English
  • Help
  • Login
  • Language 
    • Français
    • English
View Item 
  •   BIRD Home
  • CEREMADE (UMR CNRS 7534)
  • CEREMADE : Publications
  • View Item
  •   BIRD Home
  • CEREMADE (UMR CNRS 7534)
  • CEREMADE : Publications
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Browse

BIRDResearch centres & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesTypeThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesType

My Account

LoginRegister

Statistics

Most Popular ItemsStatistics by CountryMost Popular Authors
Thumbnail

Individual Vaccination as Nash Equilibrium in a SIR Model with Application to the 2009–2010 Influenza A(H1N1) Epidemic in France

Laguzet, Laetitia; Turinici, Gabriel (2015), Individual Vaccination as Nash Equilibrium in a SIR Model with Application to the 2009–2010 Influenza A(H1N1) Epidemic in France, Bulletin of mathematical biology, 77, 10, p. 1955-1984. 10.1007/s11538-015-0111-7

View/Open
Laguzet_Turinici_vaccination.pdf (571.4Kb)
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2015
Journal name
Bulletin of mathematical biology
Volume
77
Number
10
Published in
Paris
Pages
1955-1984
Publication identifier
10.1007/s11538-015-0111-7
Metadata
Show full item record
Author(s)
Laguzet, Laetitia
CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE]
Turinici, Gabriel cc
Institut Universitaire de France [IUF]
CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE]
Abstract (EN)
The vaccination against ongoing epidemics is seldom compulsory but remains one of the most classical means to fight epidemic propagation. However, recent debates concerning the innocuity of vaccines and their risk with respect to the risk of the epidemic itself lead to severe vaccination campaign failures, and new mass behaviors appeared driven by individual self-interest. Prompted by this context, we analyze, in a Susceptible–Infected–Recovered model, whether egocentric individuals can reach an equilibrium with the rest of the society. Using techniques from the “Mean Field Games” theory, we extend previous results and show that an equilibrium exists and characterizes completely the individual best vaccination strategy (with or without discounting). We also compare with a strategy based only on overall societal optimization and exhibit a situation with nonnegative price of anarchy. Finally, we apply the theory to the 2009–2010 Influenza A (H1N1) vaccination campaign in France and hint that a group of individuals stopped vaccinating at levels that indicated a pessimistic perception of the risk of the vaccine.
Subjects / Keywords
epidemic control; SIR model; individual vaccination; mean field games; vaccine scares; Nash equilibrium

Related items

Showing items related by title and author.

  • Thumbnail
    Global optimal vaccination in the SIR model: Properties of the value function and application to cost-effectiveness analysis 
    Laguzet, Laetitia; Turinici, Gabriel (2015) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
  • Thumbnail
    High order variational numerical schemes with application to Nash -MFG vaccination games 
    Laguzet, Laetitia (2018) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
  • Thumbnail
    Nash-MFG equilibrium in a SIR model with time dependent newborn vaccination 
    Hubert, Emma; Turinici, Gabriel (2018) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
  • Thumbnail
    Metric gradient flows with state dependent functionals: the Nash-MFG equilibrium flows and their numerical schemes 
    Turinici, Gabriel (2017) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
  • Thumbnail
    Optimal individual strategies for influenza vaccines with imperfect efficacy and durability of protection 
    Salvarani, Francesco; Turinici, Gabriel (2018) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Dauphine PSL Bibliothèque logo
Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny 75775 Paris Cedex 16
Phone: 01 44 05 40 94
Contact
Dauphine PSL logoEQUIS logoCreative Commons logo