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Information Disclosure to Cournot duopolists

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Date
2015
Dewey
Microéconomie
Sujet
Cournot duopoly; Information structure; Verifiable information
JEL code
C72; D82
Journal issue
Economics Letters
Volume
126
Publication date
2015
Article pages
167-170
Publisher
Elsevier
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.006
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/14456
Collections
  • LEDa : Publications
Metadata
Show full item record
Author
Eliaz, Kfir
Forges, Françoise
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
We show that in a standard symmetric Cournot duopoly with unknown demand, the optimal information disclosure policy of an informed benevolent planner is to fully inform one of the duopolists and disclose no information to the other one. We discuss possible extensions of the result.

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