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Information Disclosure to Cournot duopolists

Eliaz, Kfir; Forges, Françoise (2015), Information Disclosure to Cournot duopolists, Economics Letters, 126, p. 167-170. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.006

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2015
Journal name
Economics Letters
Volume
126
Publisher
Elsevier
Pages
167-170
Publication identifier
Metadata
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Author(s)
Eliaz, Kfir
Forges, Françoise
Abstract (EN)
We show that in a standard symmetric Cournot duopoly with unknown demand, the optimal information disclosure policy of an informed benevolent planner is to fully inform one of the duopolists and disclose no information to the other one. We discuss possible extensions of the result.
Subjects / Keywords
Cournot duopoly; Information structure; Verifiable information
JEL
C72 - Noncooperative Games
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design