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dc.contributor.authorViossat, Yannick
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-15T09:31:23Z
dc.date.available2014-12-15T09:31:23Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/14432
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectAs-if rationalityen
dc.subjectEvolutionary gamesen
dc.subjectDominated strategiesen
dc.subjectReplicator dynamicsen
dc.subjectMonotonic dynamicsen
dc.subjectInnovative dynamicsen
dc.subject.ddc519en
dc.subject.classificationjelC73en
dc.titleEvolutionary dynamics and dominated strategiesen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenDo evolutionary processes lead economic or biological agents to behave as if they were rational? To test this idea, many authors examined whether evolutionary game dynamics eliminate strictly dominated strategies. We survey, unify, and fill some gaps in this literature in the case of monotonic dynamics: a class of selection dynamics in which the growth rates of the pure strategies are ordered in accordance with their payoffs. We also survey results for other dynamics.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameEconomic Theory Bulletin
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol3
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue1
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2015
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages91-113
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40505-014-0062-4en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherSpringeren
dc.subject.ddclabelProbabilités et mathématiques appliquéesen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen


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