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dc.contributor.authorPaugam, Luc*
hal.structure.identifier
dc.contributor.authorCasta, Jean-François*
dc.date.accessioned2014-11-05T13:43:07Z
dc.date.available2014-11-05T13:43:07Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/14121
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectCommissaires aux comptesen
dc.subjectVérification comptableen
dc.subjectDivulgation en comptabilitéen
dc.subjectNormes comptables internationalesen
dc.subjectJoint Auditen
dc.subjectImpairment Testen
dc.subjectGroupthinken
dc.subjectDisclosuresen
dc.subjectIAS 36en
dc.subject.ddc657en
dc.subject.classificationjelM41en
dc.subject.classificationjelM42en
dc.titleAssessing Joint Audit Efficiency: Evidence from Impairment-Testing Disclosuresen
dc.typeDocument de travail / Working paper
dc.description.abstractenWe examine the consequences on impairment testing disclosures of auditor-pair choice made by French listed companies where two (joint) auditors are required by law. Managers are likely to manipulate impairment-testing disclosures since it relies on unverifiable fair value estimates (e.g., goodwill). Using a disclosure score for firms composing the French SBF 120 index from 2006 to 2009, we demonstrate that combination of Big 4 / non-Big 4 auditors generate higher impairment-related disclosures levels whereas the other combinations, i.e. two Big 4 or two non-Big 4, tend to decrease the level of impairment-related disclosures. We suggest that heterogeneous auditor pair is less likely to exhibit groupthinking. These results are robust to various controls variables (e.g., size, risk, year and firm fixed effects) and tend to partly challenge results from recent literature.en
dc.identifier.citationpages18en
dc.subject.ddclabelContrôle de gestion Comptabilitéen
dc.description.submittednonen
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hal.author.functionaut


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