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dc.contributor.authorElkind, Edith*
dc.contributor.authorLang, Jérôme*
dc.contributor.authorSaffidine, Abdallah*
dc.date.accessioned2014-10-30T14:03:11Z
dc.date.available2014-10-30T14:03:11Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/14107
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectelectionsen
dc.subjectCondorcet winneren
dc.subject.ddc003en
dc.titleCondorcet winning setsen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenAn alternative is said to be a Condorcet winner of an election if it is preferred to any other alternative by a majority of voters. While this is a very attractive solution concept, many elections do not have a Condorcet winner. In this paper, we propose a set-valued relaxation of this concept, which we call a Condorcet winning set: such sets consist of alternatives that collectively dominate any other alternative. We also consider a more general version of this concept, where instead of domination by a majority of voters we require domination by a given fraction θ of voters; we refer to such sets as θ -winning sets. We explore social choice-theoretic and algorithmic aspects of these solution concepts, both theoretically and empirically.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameSocial Choice and Welfare
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol44
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue3
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2015
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages493-517
dc.relation.isversionofdoi10.1007/s00355-014-0853-4en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherSpringeren
dc.subject.ddclabelRecherche opérationnelleen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.description.halcandidateoui
dc.description.readershiprecherche
dc.description.audienceInternational
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedoui
hal.person.labIds7449*
hal.person.labIds989*
hal.person.labIds107214*
hal.identifierhal-01509956*


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