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dc.contributor.authorAboura, Sofiane*
dc.contributor.authorLépinette, Emmanuel*
dc.date.accessioned2014-08-26T14:51:25Z
dc.date.available2014-08-26T14:51:25Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.issn1545-2921
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/13839
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectModigliani-Miller
dc.subjectLeverage
dc.subjectBanks
dc.subjectRegulation
dc.subject.ddc332en
dc.subject.classificationjelG3en
dc.subject.classificationjelG21en
dc.subject.classificationjelG28en
dc.titleDo Banks Satisfy the Modigliani-Miller Theorem?
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenThe capital structure of banks has become the focus of an extended debate among policymakers, regulators and academics. The seminal Modigliani-Miller (1958) theorem is seen as supportive of regulators' drive to require higher equity capital to banks. This raises the question on to what extent does Modigliani-Miller theorem hold for banks. This article brings a new insight of the Modigliani-Miller theorem by considering the implicit government guarantee offered to banks. Our theorem shows that a bank does not satisfy the Modigliani-Miller theorem. The main result indicates that banks will favor leverage instead of equity.
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameEconomics Bulletin
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol35
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue2
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2015
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages924-935
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie financièreen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenon
dc.description.halcandidateoui
dc.description.readershiprecherche
dc.description.audienceInternational
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedoui
dc.date.updated2016-10-07T15:16:45Z
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