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dc.contributor.authorMarini, François
dc.date.accessioned2014-07-08T08:47:47Z
dc.date.available2014-07-08T08:47:47Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/13657
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectOptimal banking panicen
dc.subjectBank failureen
dc.subjectDeposit insuranceen
dc.subjectPanic of 1857en
dc.subject.ddc332en
dc.subject.classificationjelG21en
dc.titleOptimal financial crises: A note on Allen and Galeen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenThis note provides an example of an optimal banking panic. We construct a model in which a banking panic is triggered by the banker, not the depositors. When the banker receives a pessimistic information on the return on the bank's assets, he liquidates them prematurely in order to protect his capital. In the face of this liquidation, all depositors withdraw their funds prematurely. The premature liquidation of the bank's assets strengthens the bank's balance sheet. As a result, the banking panic does not cause bank failure and the government should not try to prevent the panic. Such a panic occured in 1857 in the United States.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameThe Geneva Risk and Insurance Review
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol31en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2006
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages61-66en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10713-006-9468-8en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherSpringeren
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie financièreen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.relation.forthcomingprintnonen


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