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dc.contributor.authorde La Bruslerie, Hubert
dc.contributor.authorGabteni, Heger
dc.date.accessioned2014-07-02T11:58:18Z
dc.date.available2014-07-02T11:58:18Z
dc.date.issued2012-02
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/13645
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectPublication scoreen
dc.subjectVoluntary disclosureen
dc.subjectFinancial communicationen
dc.subjectInformation policyen
dc.subjectIFRS introductionen
dc.subjectAnalysts’ forecastsen
dc.subject.ddc657en
dc.subject.classificationjelM40en
dc.subject.classificationjelM41en
dc.titleVoluntary Disclosure vs. Mandatory Disclosure: The Case of IFRS Introduction on European Firmsen
dc.typeDocument de travail / Working paper
dc.description.abstractenThe purpose of this study is to determine if the process of filtering out the financial information voluntary disclosed by firms is modified by the introduction of new mandatory information requirement. Voluntary information disclosed by French firms during the 2003-2008 period is compiled. This original dataset includes several years both before and after the introduction of the IFRS in the European Union in 2005. We use regression analysis to identify the determinants and consequences of the communications policies of listed firms. Particularly, we show that highly communicative firms may reduce the information asymmetry as measured by the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts when they voluntarily disclose information. The level of voluntary disclosure and earnings forecasts by analysts are endogenous and exhibit a complex two-way relationship. Voluntary communication policies did not change with the introduction of the IFRS.en
dc.identifier.citationpages48en
dc.identifier.urlsitehttp://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2010326en
dc.subject.ddclabelContrôle de gestion Comptabilitéen
dc.description.submittednonen


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