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Implementing just and efficient decision-making

Moulin, Hervé (1981), Implementing just and efficient decision-making, Journal of Public Economics, 16, 2, p. 193-213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(81)90024-4

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
1981
Nom de la revue
Journal of Public Economics
Volume
16
Numéro
2
Éditeur
Elsevier
Pages
193-213
Identifiant publication
Métadonnées
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Auteur(s)
Moulin, Hervé
Résumé (EN)
In an economy with one public good, one private good and quasi-linear utilities we explore decision-making mechanisms to non-cooperatively implement an efficient outcome. By auctioning the leadership role among agents, one implements egalitarianism, namely the efficient outcome that distributes equally the surplus available from an a priori given status quo. A refinement of this mechanism (so-called autioning the leadership with differentiated buds) allows us to implement an efficient anonymous and neutral outcome: it achieves egalitarianism above the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves decision.
Mots-clés
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves decision; decision-making mechanisms