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dc.contributor.authorTurinici, Gabriel
HAL ID: 16
ORCID: 0000-0003-2713-006X
dc.contributor.authorHaguet, Eleonore
dc.contributor.authorBialecki, Agnes
dc.subjectcostly informationen
dc.subjectGrossman-Stiglitz paradoxen
dc.subjectheterogeneous estimationsen
dc.subjectheterogeneous beliefsen
dc.subjectinformation acquisitionen
dc.titleExistence of an equilibrium for lower semi-continuous information acquisition functionsen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherÉcole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique (ENSAE);France
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherÉcole normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS LYON);France
dc.description.abstractenWe consider a two period model in which a continuum of agents trade in a context of costly information acquisition and systematic heteroge- neous expectations biases. Because of systematic biases agents are sup- posed not to learn from others' decisions. In a previous work under some- how strong technical assumptions a market equilibrium was proved to exist and the supply and demand functions were proved to be strictly monotonic with respect to the price. Here we extend these results under very weak technical assumptions. We also prove that the equilibrium price maximizes the trading volume and further additional properties (such as the anti-monotonicity of the trading volume with respect to the marginal information price).en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameJournal of Applied Mathematics
dc.subject.ddclabelProbabilités et mathématiques appliquéesen

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